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NIXON v. FITZGERALD: PRESIDENTIAL
IMMUNITY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL
IMPERATIVE
Government officials have long enjoyed some degree of immunity from
civil suits for damages.' Rooted in English common law,2 immunity
shields officials from civil liability for official actions that are discretion-
ary3 and within the scope of their authority.4
1. See generally Freed, Executive Official Immunity for Constitutional Violations. An
Analysis and a Critique, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 526 (1977). This Note will discuss the personal
liability of officials to causes of action for monetary damages. The doctrine of immunity
does not bar other forms of relief. For example, courts have consistently allowed plaintiffs
injunctive relief to forestall ongoing constitutional violations by officials. Id
2. The common-law roots of judicial immunity can be traced to the maxim, "the King
can do no wrong." See Gray, Private Wrongs of Public Servants, 47 CAL. L. REv. 303, 311
(1959). Because judges were empowered by the King to dispense justice, the King alone
could discipline them. In short, judges possessed absolute immunity. Id Immunity for legis-
lators grew out of struggles between the King and Parliament. Members of Parliament
sought to protect their independence from criminal prosecutions by the King. Freed, supra
note 1, at 528 n.14. These struggles culminated in passage of the Bill of Rights of 1689,
which provided speech and debate immunity. I W. & M., Sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689). This provi-
sion later served as a model for the Constitution's speech and debate clause. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 6, cl. 1. Less certain in English common law was the immunity accorded executive
branch officers. See Freed, supra note 1, at 528. After 1750, policemen were liable only if
they did not act in good faith. See Gray, supra, at 318. The defense of good faith also
appears to have bee4 available to at least some other executive branch officials. See Scheuer
v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 239 n.4 (1974); Freed, supra note 1, at 528.
3. Historically, officials who performed ministerial duties could not avoid liability
when they erred or refused to act. Freed, supra note 1, at 531 n.28. Prior to Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) and Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), officials were
immune from liability when exercising discretion. See generally Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S.
564, 573-75 (1959) (plurality opinion); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498-99 (1896).
Scheuer and Economou eliminated the distinction between "ministerial" and 'discretionary"
at least for suits alleging constitutional violations.
4. As a predicate for extending immunity, courts have consistently required that an
official's acts fall within the scope of his statutory and constitutional authority. See, e.g.,
Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 247 ("[I]n varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of
the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of discre-
tion and responsibilities of the office .... "); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. at 575 (plurality
opinion) ("The fact that the action here taken was within the outer perimeter of [the offi-
cial's] line of duty is enough to render the [immunity] privilege applicable .... "). The
Supreme Court has given broad meaning to the term "scope of authority." For example, the
Court has refused to place unlawful official behavior, which by its nature is unauthorized,
outside the scope of official authority. Rather, behavior falls within the scope of authority if
its purpose was generally authorized by statute or the Constitution. Matteo, 360 U.S. at 572
(quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)). An official's "scope of au-
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Historically, courts have justified granting official immunity on policy
grounds. First, courts have concluded that it would be unjust to subject to
liability officials who are required by law to exercise discretion.5 Second,
courts have reasoned that the threat of civil liability would deter officials
from acting decisively.6 Third, it is feared that without immunity officials
would devote considerable time and resources to defending civil suits at
the public's expense.'
The Supreme Court has recognized two types of official immunity-ab-
solute' and qualified.9 Absolute immunity operates as a complete bar to
relief, regardless of an official's motive for taking a challenged action.'
Qualified immunity offers more limited protection. To obtain qualified im-
munity, officials must first demonstrate that they acted without malice and
in the reasonable belief that their conduct was legal." The presence of
either bad faith or knowledge of wrongdoing bars an official from raising
the defense of qualified immunity. Once granted, however, qualified im-
munity, like absolute immunity, precludes a plaintiffs recovery.
At common law, courts consistently granted absolute immunity to
judges, legislators, and executive branch officials.' 2 The immunity af-
forded executive officials, however, underwent a major transformation in
thority," however, is not unlimited. It would appear that an official would not be acting
within the scope of authority, for example, if he committed assault and battery.
5. See Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 239-40; Matteo, 360 U.S. at 570; Spalding, 161 U.S. at 498-
99.
6. See Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 240; Matteo, 360 U.S. at 571; Spalding, 161 U.S. at 498-99.
See also Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d at 581 ("[T]o submit all officials, the innocent as well
as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome would
dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible in the unflinching
discharge of their duties.").
7. See Matteo, 360 U.S. at 571. See also Freed, supra note 1, at 529-30.
8. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (hearing examiner and agency
attorney); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (judge); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409 (1976) (prosecutor); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) (aide to United States
Senator); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (state legislator). See infra notes 62-81
and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) (prison administrator);
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (state hospital superintendent); Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (school board member); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232
(1974) (governor); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (policeman). See infra notes 47-61
and accompanying text.
10. Economou, 438 U.S. at 508-11; accord 1mbler, 424 U.S. at 422; Matteo, 360 U.S. at
575.
11. Wood, 420 U.S. at 321-22 (1975).
12. Legislative immunity arises out of the Constitution's speech and debate clause, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. The immunity afforded judges and executive branch officers is a
common law invention. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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the mid- 1970's.' 3 At that time, the Supreme Court held that executive offi-
cials normally were entitled only to qualified immunity from civil suit. 4 In
addition, the Court dramatically altered its analysis of the immunity issue.
The Court decided to premise absolute immunity on an official's function,
rather than his office.'" The Court held that officials would be absolutely
immune whenever they functioned in a judicial or legislative capacity.' 6
An executive branch official, such as a prosecutor or administrative law
judge, also would be entitled to absolute immunity when performing a
quasi-judicial responsibility. 7 But absent a showing that an absolute ex-
emption from liability was required by public policy, an official who did
not perform legislative or judicial tasks might only claim qualified immu-
nity.'8 The Court characterized this analysis as a functional approach.1'
In granting qualified immunity to federal executive officials, the
Supreme Court had hinted that such limited protection would be the rule,
regardless of the official's rank. In Nixon v: Fitzgerald,2 ° the Court specifi-
cally confronted the question of presidential immunity.
In 1970, the United States Air Force fired A. Ernest Fitzgerald, a weap-
ons analyst, shortly after he disclosed to Congress the existence of massive
defense department cost-overruns.2' Eight years later, Fitzgerald filed a
complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
against former President Richard M. Nixon and ex-White House aides
Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield.22 Fitzgerald sought damages re-
lief against the three defendants, alleging that he was fired in retaliation
for his congressional testimony. Nixon, Harlow, and Butterfield moved for
summary judgment, arguing that they were entitled to absolute immunity
from suit. The district court denied the motion for summary judgment,
reasoning that President Nixon and his aides were entitled only to quali-
fied immunity.23
13. See Note, Presidential Immunity From Constitutional Damage Liability, 60 B.U.L.
REV. 879 (1980).
14. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478
(1978).
15. 438 U.S. at 511.
16. Id. at 508-10; Brandhove, 341 U.S. at 376-79.
17. Economou, 438 U.S. at 511-12 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423 n.20).
18. 438 U.S. at 507.
19. Id. at 512.
20. 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982).
21. Id at 2693-94.
22. Id at 2697. Fitzgerald's filing in 1978 was a second amended complaint. He had
filed an initial complaint in district court four years earlier. Id at 2696-97. See infra text
accompanying notes 114-15.
23. Fitzgerald v. Butterfield, No. 74-178 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 1980) (order denying motion
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Nixon, Harlow, and Butterfield filed an interlocutory appeal with the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The
court dismissed the appeal summarily for lack of jurisdiction.24 On appeal,
the Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, held that President Nixon
was entitled to absolute immunity for all acts performed within the "outer
perimeter" of his authority.2" The Court reasoned that absolute immunity
was required by the separation of powers doctrine and was confirmed by
public policy and constitutional history. In the companion decision of
Harlow v. Fitzgerald,26 the Court recognized qualified immunity for
Harlow and Butterfield.
This Note discusses the impact of Nixon v. Fitzgerald on the jurispru-
dence of official immunity and the doctrine of separation of powers.27 In
describing immunity law, it traces the evolution of the Supreme Court's
functional approach to absolute immunity and the emergence in the mid-
1970's of qualified immunity as the usual protection afforded public offi-
cials. This Note concludes that the extension of absolute immunity to the
President is inconsistent with the functional approach taken by the Court
and not justified on the basis of either public policy or the separation of
powers doctrine. It argues that the new objective standard for qualified
immunity enunciated in Harlow is sufficient to protect the President and
other public officials from frivolous lawsuits.
I. THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
In feudal England, official immunity was based on the tenet that the
King can do no wrong.2" Gradually, however, policy reasons supplanted
English political theory as the underlying common law justification for im-
munity. Although the notion that the King can do no wrong survives to-
day in American jurisprudence in the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
American courts have relied exclusively on public policy grounds for ac-
cording immunity from civil liability to judges and executive branch
for summary judgment). The three defendants also argued that the statute of limitations
had run on Fitzgerald's claims but the court dismissed this claim. See Fitzgerald, No. 74-178
(D.D.C. Mar. 26, 1980) (memorandum regarding statute of limitations).
24. Fitzgerald v. Butterfield, No. 80-1406 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 30, 1980). See infra notes 121
& 123 and accompanying text.
25. 102 S. Ct. at 2705.
26. 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982).
27. This Note focuses on key Supreme Court decisions in the area of immunity law.
Lower federal and state courts generally have followed the Court's lead in the area of public
official immunity. See Kass, Damage SuitsAgainst.Public Officers, 129 U. PA. L. Rv. 1110,
1119 & n.35 (1981).
28. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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officials.29
In 1871, the Supreme Court first addressed the policy reasons for official
immunity when it reviewed a civil claim filed against a judge in Bradley v.
Fisher.30 In Bradley, a trial judge had disbarred the attorney who repre-
sented an alleged coconspirator in the plot to assassinate President Lin-
coln. The attorney sought damages relief against the judge, alleging that
the disbarment was malicious. The Supreme Court held that the judge was
absolutely immune from civil suit for his judicial acts.3 '
Drawing on English common law, the Court reasoned that absolute im-
munity was needed to safeguard judicial independence. 32 The strong pas-
sions engendered by litigation could spur a losing party to allege malice on
the part of the judge. Sincere judges would be subjected to "vexatious
actions. 33 The Court noted, moreover, that the remedy of impeachment
was available against judges who acted maliciously.
Twenty-five years after Bradley, the Supreme Court applied the same
policy analysis in Spalding v. Vilas34 to extend absolute immunity to fed-
eral executive officers. In Spalding, the motives of an attorney who repre-
sented local postmasters in a salary dispute were impugned in a letter
circulated by the United States Postmaster General. The attorney brought
a defamation suit against the Postmaster General who at the time was a
member of the President's cabinet. The Court held that even if he had
acted with malice, the Postmaster General was absolutely immune from
civil suit for discretionary acts within the scope of his authority.3'
The Court reasoned that the same policy considerations enunciated in
Bradley supporting absolute immunity for judges should apply to execu-
tive officials. The Court determined that civil liability would "seriously
29. See Freed, supra note 1, at 529.
30. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871). Prior to Bradley, the Court considered the liability of
federal officers to claims for damages arising from state law violations. For example, in
Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804), the Court held the commander of an Ameri-
can warship liable in damages for seizing, without proper authority, a Danish ship on the
high seas. The commander was held liable for trespass because the seizure in question had
not been authorized by law. In Kendall v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 87 (1845), the Postmas-
ter General was exempted from damages liability for mistakenly suspending payments to a
creditor of the post office. The Court found that the Postmaster was authorized to suspend
payments. These cases focused on whether a federal officer had exceeded his statutory au-
thority and held that an official should be liable in damages for actions taken outside the
scope of authority. The Court, however, did not address the underlying policy reasons for
exempting federal officers from liability for state law offenses.
31. 80 U.S. at 354.
32. Id at 347.
33. Id at 349.
34. 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
35. Id at 498-99.
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cripple the proper. . . administration of public affairs" by the executive
branch,36 and concluded that it would be unjust to subject an executive
branch official to the constant dread that his motives might be challenged
in court. The Court stressed, however, that to be immune from suit an
official must act "more or less" within the scope of his official duties.37
After Spalding, federal courts extended absolute immunity to a wide range
of federal executive officials, 38 requiring only that the officials had exer-
cised discretion within the scope of their official duties.39
In Barr v. Matteo,4 a plurality of the Supreme Court held that absolute
immunity was available to federal executive officials generally, not merely
to executive officers of cabinet rank.4 In Matteo, two employees of the
Federal Office of Rent Stabilization sued their superior for defamation.
The suit was precipitated by the publication of a press release in which the
superior promised to suspend the employees for promoting an unpopular
budget plan.42 As in Spalding, a common law tort was the basis for the
plaintiffs' suit for damages. 43
In holding that the defendant official was absolutely immune from civil
suit for his discretionary acts within the "outer perimeter" of his authority,
the Court echoed the policy grounds developed in Spalding." In addition,
the Matteo Court added a third policy justification-that defending
against civil suits would "consume time and energies which would other-
wise be devoted to governmental service . . . ."" The Court refused to
consider the plaintiffs' allegation that the defendant acted with malice. An
inquiry into motive would defeat the privilege's usefulness, the Court rea-
36. Id at 498.
37. Id
38. See, e.g., Taylor v. Glotfelty, 201 F.2d 51 (6th Cir. 1952) (prison psychiatrist); Papa-
gianakis v. The Samos, 186 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1950), cer. denied, 341 U.S. 921 (1951) (immi-
gration officer); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949
(1950) (Attorney General); Laughlin v. Rosenman, 163 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (Special
Counsel to the President); Laughlin v. Garnett, 138 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1943), cert. denied,
322 U.S. 738 (1944) (United States Attorney); Cooper v. O'Connor, 99 F.2d 135 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 305 U.S. 643 (1938) (F.B.I. agent, Comptroller of the Currency); Standard Nut
Margarine Co. v. Mellon, 72 F.2d 557 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 605 (1934) (Treas-
ury Secretary); Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926), afrd, 275 U.S. 503 (1927) (special
assistant to the Attorney General); Camp v. Recreation Bd., 104 F. Supp. 10 (D.D.C. 1952)
(Interior Secretary).
39. Freed, supra note 1, at 527.
40. 360 U.S. 564 (1959) (plurality opinion).
41. "The privilege is not a badge or emolument of exalted office, but an expression of
policy designed to aid in the effective functioning of government." Id. at 572-73.
42. Id at 567 n.5.
43. Id at 568.
44. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
45. 360 U.S. at 571.
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soned, because it would subject an official to a costly trial on the strength
of an allegation of bad faith.46
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY STANDARD
In Scheuer v. Rhodes,47 the Court confronted the question of immunity
for officials who had not been accorded immunity at common law. In
Scheuer, the personal representatives of four students killed at Kent State
University in 1970 sought damages, for violation of the students' civil
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,4s from the governor of Ohio, officials of the
state's national guard, and the president of the state-funded university.49
Although the Court ultimately granted the officials qualified immunity, it
examined the effect its decision would have on the underlying purpose of
section 1983. The Court observed that the provision's purpose was to pro-
vide relief to parties deprived of their constitutional rights by state offi-
cials.5" The law would be "drained of meaning" if state officials, the
primary targets of section 1983 protection, were given absolute immu-
nity."' Yet the Court found that some form of immunity was justified.
Because governors and national guard officers must act "swiftly and
firmly," 52 personal liability might deter decisive official action. Reiterating
the policy grounds cited in Bradley and Spalding, the Court reasoned that
it would be unfair to hold executive officials liable for good faith acts when
they were legally obligated to act. Therefore, the state officials in Scheuer
should receive qualified immunity coterminous with the scope of their dis-
46. Id at 575 (quoting Brandhove, 341 U.S. at 377 (1951)).
47. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Section 1983 provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
49. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 234. Prior to Scheuer, the Supreme Court had held judges and
legislators absolutely immune from § 1983 liability. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967)
(judges); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (legislators). The Court found that the
policy reasons underlying immunity from common-law torts applied to § 1983 claims with
equal force. For example, in Pierson, the Court concluded that allowing § 1983 claims to be
prosecuted against judges would inhibit "principled and fearless decisionmaking." 386 U.S.
at 553-55. In light of the compelling reasons for immunity, the Court decided that Congress,
in passing § 1983, would not have repealed the existing common-law immunity of legislators
and judges without including express language to carry out the repeal. See Pierson, 386 U.S.
at 554-55; Brandhove, 341 U.S. at 376.
50. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 243.
51. Id at 248.
52. Id at 246.
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cretionary responsibilities.53
The qualified immunity standard the Court adopted in Scheuer was
clarified in Wood v. Strickland.s4 In Strickland, the Court upheld qualified
immunity for school board members against a section 1983 action brought
by two students who had been expelled from school.5" The Strickland
Court found that the qualified immunity standard comprised subjective
and objective components. The subjective component required a court to
determine if an official had acted with malice. The objective component
demanded that a court decide whether the official knew or should reason-
ably have known that his acts were illegal. The Court held that the pres-
ence of malice or knowledge of wrongdoing would defeat the claim of
qualified immunity.
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,6 the Supreme Court broke new ground by al-
tering the qualified immunity standard articulated in Strickland. The
Court eliminated the subjective component of the standard, making con-
sideration of motive irrelevant." The subjective component had made it
difficult to dismiss frivolous lawsuits against government officials. All too
often, the Court observed, the subjective element of motive had been
viewed as a genuine issue of fact requiring resolution at trial.5" Addition-
ally, an inquiry into potential malice sanctioned intrusive discovery aimed
at pinpointing an official's state of mind.
Instead, the Court announced a two-step analysis to determine whether
a court should grant qualified immunity. First, as a threshold matter, a
court must determine if the statutory or constitutional right asserted by the
plaintiff was clear at the time of the alleged wrongful action. Second, it
must determine whether the official should reasonably have known the ac-
tion was contrary to law.59 Generally, if the law was unambiguous, an
official would face a rebuttable presumption that he knew the state of the
law at the time he acted.
In Harlow, the Court noted that, normally, executive branch officials
could only expect to receive qualified immunity from civil suits for dam-
53. Id at 247.
54. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
55. Id at 310.
56. 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982).
57. Id at 2738.
58. The subjective element of the good faith defense has proved incompatible
with our admonition in Economou that insubstantial claims should not proceed to
trial.. .. [A]n official's subjective good faith has been considered to be a question
of fact that some courts have regarded as inherently requiring resolution by a jury.
Id at 2737-38.
59. Id at 2739.
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ages.' The Court reaffirmed its view-adopted in the mid-1970's-that
officials could obtain absolute immunity if they could demonstrate that the
public's interest required a blanket exemption.6 That determination re-
quired a court to perform a functional analysis.
III. THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY: IMBLER
AND EcoNoMou
With Imbler v. Pachiman ,62 the Supreme Court began to reshape its ap-
proach to the jurisprudence of absolute immunity. In Imbler, the Court
granted absolute immunity on the basis of function rather than office, devi-
ating from the analysis in Spalding and Matteo. Consequently, executive
officials would not automatically be granted absolute immunity. Instead, a
blanket exemption from civil liability would only be allowed when public
policy required it.
In Imbler, the Supreme Court reviewed a section 1983 action filed
against a prosecutor. The Court held that prosecutors were absolutely im-
mune under the common law for the same policy reasons that it had iden-
tified in Bradley to justify absolute immunity for judges. 63 Personal
liability would divert a prosecutor's energies from public duties to defend-
ing civil suits-at the public's expense. Liability also would preclude vigor-
ous performance by a prosecutor of his official responsibilities.'
While the Bradley Court limited its holding to judges, the Imbler Court
asserted that function rather than office would be the touchstone for grant-
ing absolute immunity in the future. A prosecutor would be covered be-
cause he performed a "quasi-judicial" function. Like a judge, a prosecutor
would frequently be the target of civil suits because "a defendant often will
transform his resentment at being prosecuted into the ascription of im-
proper and malicious actions . . ,,61 The Court stressed that protections
other than relief in damages were available to an aggrieved party, ranging
from the remedial powers of the trial judge and appellate review to crimi-
nal penalties against the prosecutor.66 Additionally, the Court narrowed
the reach of absolute immunity to those activities arising from a prosecu-
tor's quasi-judicial functions. In dicta, the Court indicated that a prosecu-
60. Id at 2733; accord Economou, 438 U.S. at 508.
61. 102 S. Ct. at 2733.
62. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
63. Id at 422-23.
64. Id at 423-24 (quoting Pearson v. Reed, 6 Cal. App. 2d 277, 287, 44 P.2d 592, 597
(1935)).
65. 424 U.S. at 425.
66. Id. at 427.
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tor would not receive absolute immunity when he acted in an
administrative or investigative capacity.67
The holding of 1mbler was limited to section 1983 claims against state
officials for constitutional violations. In Butz v. Economou,61 the Supreme
Court considered the immunity available to officials in defending a suit
brought against federal officials for constitutional violations. 69 In Econo-
mou, a disgruntled commodities trader sued the United States Secretary of
Agriculture and several Department of Agriculture officials for initiating
unauthorized departmental proceedings against him.70 The commodities
trader sued for damages directly under the Constitution, 7' alleging various
infractions of his rights.
In determining what type of immunity should be accorded the Secretary,
the Court first distinguished Spalding and Matteo, two cases which ap-
peared to hold that an executive branch official was absolutely immune for
any actions taken within the outer perimeter 72 of his official duties.73 The
Court found that neither case had reached the question of the potential
liability of officials who had exceeded their constitutional authority. 4
67. "We have no occasion to consider whether like or similar reasons require immunity
for those aspects of the prosecutor's responsibility that cast him in the role of an administra-
tor or investigative officer rather than that of advocate." Id at 430-31 (footnote omitted).
68. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
69. The Supreme Court earlier had recognized a private cause of action for damages
arising directly under the Constitution in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In Bivens, the plaintiff claimed that his fourth
amendment rights were violated when federal agents arrested him and searched his home
without a warrant. The Court observed that the "very essence of civil liability," id at 397
(quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)), was the right to claim
protection under the law, and that damages were the "ordinary remedy for an invasion of
personal interests in liberty." 403 U.S. at 395 (citations omitted): The Court stopped short,
however, of deciding a key issue raised by its recognition of a private remedy for unconstitu-
tional behavior-namely, the liability of the federal agents to civil suit. (The Court stated
that it had not addressed the immunity issue because the appeals court below had not con-
sidered it.) On remand, the Second Circuit held that the agents were eligible only for quali-
fied immunity. Most other circuits followed the Second Circuit's lead. See, e.g., G.M.
Leasing Corp. v. United States, 560 F.2d 1011 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1977);
Jones v. United States, 536 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); Weir
v. Muller, 527 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1976); Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975); Mark
v. Groff, 521 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1975); Brubaker v. King, 505 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1974);
Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1974); States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Shultz, 498 F.2d
1146 (4th Cir. 1974).
70. 438 U.S. at 481.
71. Economou brought his action pursuant to Bivens. See supra note 69.
72. See Matteo, 360 U.S. at 575. ("The fact that the action here taken was within the
outer perimeter of petitioner's line of duty is enough to render the privilege applicable
73. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
74. Economou, 438 U.S. at 495.
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Just as Scheuer had considered the impact of immunity on section 1983
actions, the Economou Court looked to the effect of immunity on the abil-
ity of parties to sue for damages directly under the Constitution. Absolute
immunity, the Court concluded, would "drain" such a remedy of sub-
stance." In addition, such a blanket exemption would violate the princi-
ple that no individual is above the law.76 Moreover, the Court reasoned
that it would be anomalous to grant federal officials more protection for
their unconstitutional behavior than it had accorded state officials in
Scheuer."7 Therefore, the Court concluded that a cabinet officer was pro-
tected only by qualified immunity.7"
Turning to the allegations against the agency attorney and the hearing
examine-(now called an administrative law judge), the Court recognized,
as it had in Imbler, that an official might qualify for absolute protection if
he could demonstrate that he performed "special functions" that were "es-
sential to the conduct of the public's business."79 The Court held that both
officials were entitled to absolute immunity for their official acts. First, the
Court noted that agency attorneys and administrative law judges perform
a "quasi-judicial" function in administrative adjudications, acting as pros-
ecutor and judge respectively. Second, both types of officials were likely to
be targets of frequent civil suits by losing parties. Third, the Court ob-
served that, as in the judicial setting, the adjudicative process afforded a
party various safeguards to prevent or remedy arbitrary actions taken by
official participants.8 0 The Court was concerned with keeping frivolous
claims out of court and encouraged courts to dismiss such claims quickly.'
Following Economou, the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit, in Haperin v. Kissinger, 2 applied the functional
analysis to determine whether a President was entitled to absolute immu-
nity. Former National Security Advisor Morton Halperin had sued Presi-
dent Nixon and other executive branch officials for illegal wiretapping.
Applying the functional approach articulated in Economou, the court of
appeals held that the former President was entitled only to qualified im-
75. Id at 501.
76. Id at 506.
77. In Harlow, the Court made the same argument in extending qualified immunity to
White House aides. 102 S. Ct. at 2734.
78. Economou, 438 U.S. at 507.
79. Id
80. Id at 511-17.
81. Id at 507-08.
82. 606 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979), aj7dper curiam in part by an equally divided court,
cert. dismised in part, 452 U.S. 713 (1981).
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munity from the claim.83
The District of Columbia Circuit rejected the contention that the Presi-
dent should receive absolute immunity because of his unique status. The
court concluded that absolute immunity was not justified on public policy
grounds." Moreover, limited liability was intended to check executive be-
havior that threatened constitutional rights and would not hamper effec-
tive government. A serious commitment to the remedy fashioned in Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics5 required
that high-level officials, not just their subordinates, be subject to suit. This
was required by the principle of equal justice under law.86 The court also
noted that the protection offered by qualified immunity took into account
the special time demands made on a President. 7
The Halperin court also recognized that public policy arguments alone
could not dispose of the question of presidential immunity. The District of
Columbia Circuit concluded that presidential immunity had a constitu-
tional facet, a facet not fully present when suits were brought against other
federal officials.88 In short, a civil suit against the President required the
judiciary to consider whether such an assertion of court jurisdiction would
be permitted by the separation of powers doctrine.8 9
IV. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE
While the separation of powers doctrine is central to the constitutional
design of the federal government, it defies strict legal definition. Actually,
it is a political theory rather than a technical rule of law.9 The separation
83. Id at 1213.
84. Id at 1212-13.
85. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See supra note 69.
86. The appeals court noted that election to office is not meant to exempt officials from
application of the laws: "No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No
officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All officers of the government,
from the highest to the least, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it." Haperin,
606 F.2d at 1213 (quoting United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882)). See Economou,
438 U.S. at 506.
87. Ha#pern, 606 F.2d at 1212-13. A President would be entitled to "consult fewer
sources and expend less effort inquiring into the circumstances of a localized problem" par-
ticularly in an emergency. This would make it extremely difficult for a plaintiff to defeat a
President's good faith immunity. Id (quoting Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83, 93 (D.C. Cir.
1974)).
88. See Harlow, 102 S. Ct. at 2735 n.17 ("Suits against other officials--including Presi-
dential aides-generally do not invoke separation-of-powers considerations to the same ex-
tent as suits against the President himself.").
89. The court of appeals held that the separation of powers doctrine did not require
absolute presidential immunity. See infra note 108.
90. See Frankfurter & Landis, Power ofCongress over Procedure in Crinal Contempts
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of powers doctrine requires that federal power be dispersed in independ-
ent, coordinate branches of government. In this way, power cannot be
concentrated in a single, tyrannical branch. Although the legislative, judi-
cial, and executive branches are independent, their functions overlap, pro-
viding a series of checks and balances which ensure that the integrity of
each branch is preserved.9
Beginning with United States v. Burr92 and continuing in a series of de-
cisions that tested a President's executive privilege to withhold informa-
tion, the Court examined the extent to which the separation of powers-
principle affected a President's immunity from judicial process. In Burr,
Chief Justice Marshall authorized the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
to President Jefferson to produce a private letter thought relevant to Aaron
Burr's defense against a treason charge. 93 President Jefferson claimed ex-
ecutive privilege and refused to release the letter. Invoking Marbury v.
in "lnferior" Federal Courta-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1010,
1012-16 (1924). "In a word, we are dealing with what Sir Henry Maine, following Madison,
calls a 'political doctrine,' and not a technical rule of law. Nor has it been treated by the
Supreme Court as a technical legal doctrine." Id. at 1014.
91. The Supreme Court consistently has used the separation of powers doctrine to vali-
date its claim to judicial review power. That power enables the Court to determine whether
executive actions and congressional enactments are constitutional. In Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), the Court asserted the power of judicial review for the first
time. Speaking through Chief Justice Marshall, the Court held that judicial review was
essential to the independent role for the judiciary charted by the Constitution. The Court
stated that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is." Id at 177.
One hundred and fifty years later, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1952), the Supreme Court found that judicial review was required by the overlaps be-
tween federal departments envisioned by the Constitution. In Youngstown, the Supreme
Court held that President Truman exceeded his constitutional and statutory authority when
he ordered seizure of the nation's steel mills to avert a nationwide strike. The Court noted
that its power to review presidential orders was inherent in the federal government's consti-
tutional design. As Justice Jackson pointed out in his historic concurrence: "While the Con-
stitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will
integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches
separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity." Id at 635 (Jackson, J., con-
curring). Accord Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 442-43 (1977);
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974); HalperM, 606 F.2d at 1211-12 & 1212
n.136.
The Court has consistently rejected the "archaic" view that separation of powers means
complete independence for each governmental branch. Administrator of General Services,
433 U.S. at 443. In doing so, the Court early on adopted the conception of the separation of
powers doctrine provided by James Madison in Federalist No. 47. THE FEDERALIST No. 47
(J. Madison). For further discussion of the conflicting views of separation of powers, see
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634-35 and 635 n.1 (Jackson, J., concurring).
92. 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692) (Chief Justice Marshall sitting as cir-
cuit justice).
93. Id at 34-35.
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Madison's authority to decide what the law is, Chief Justice Marshall ruled
that ultimately the courts must decide whether an assertion of executive
privilege is valid, although due deference must be accorded to the Presi-
dent. Here, he found that a blanket privilege was not justified.94 The privi-
lege to withhold the letter would only exist if disclosure threatened the
"public safety.""'
In the Watergate tapes case, United States v. Nixon,96 the Court again
looked at an assertion of executive privilege in the context of criminal pro-
ceedings. It upheld the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum by Watergate
Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski to compel in camera disclosure of taped
White House conversations. Jaworski sought the materials in connection
with the criminal prosecutions of Attorney General John Mitchell and var-
ious White House aides. President Nixon opposed releasing the tapes on
two grounds: first, he asserted that the separation of powers doctrine
barred release, and second, he argued that even if release was constitu-
tional it should not be ordered because of the important need to safeguard
White House deliberations from disclosure.97
The Court reaffirmed its responsibility under the Constitution to deter-
mine if an executive action was constitutional.98 The Court concluded that
"without more" neither the separation of powers doctrine nor the public's
interest in preserving the confidentiality of presidential communications
could justify "an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity
from judicial process under all circumstances." 99
The Court used a balancing test to weigh the President's interest in con-
fidentiality against the judiciary's article III responsibility under the Con-
stitution to ensure fairness in the criminal justice system."° On the one
hand, the Court found that effective presidential decisionmaking required
the free exchange of ideas between a President and his aides. A breach in
confidentiality could inhibit this exchange. The Court found, moreover,
that the privilege is inherent in the separation of powers doctrine because
confidentiality is essential to an effective Presidency.' 0 ' Weighing against
the exercise of the privilege, however, was the judiciary's own constitu-
94. See id at 34 ("The propriety of introducing any paper into a case as testimony, must
depend on the character of the paper, not on the character of the person who holds it.").
95. Id at 37.
96. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
97. Id at 703.
98. Id at 703-05. Specifically, the Court invoked Marbury v. Madison and Burr as au-
thority for its power of judicial review. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
99. 418 U.S. at 706.
100. Id at 711-12.
101. id at 711-13.
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tional function-also protected by the separation of powers doctrine--of
ensuring justice in criminal prosecutions. An absolute privilege would se-
riously impair the judiciary's basic function under article III and under-
mine the principles of "dispersed powers" and "workable government"
inherent in the separation of powers doctrine. 2 The Court concluded
that the tapes must be released for in camera inspection. But it expressly
reserved the question of whether executive privilege required presidential
immunity from civil suit.10
3
In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, the Court examined
President Nixon's claim of executive privilege in light of a specific statute
requiring White House tapes and materials to be turned over to the execu-
tive branch for archival purposes. The Court examined whether the law's
disclosure requirement violated the separation of powers doctrine,10 5 using
a two-step analysis that further refined the balancing test adopted in United
States v. Nixon. °" First, a court must decide if one branch has disrupted a
function assigned to another branch. Second, if a disruption has occurred,
the court must balance the competing interests and decide if the intrusion
reflects an "overriding need" to promote a constitutionally valid objective.
In this case, the Court found that the intrusion was not "unduly disrup-
tive" because of several safeguards in the law. For example, the statute
was administered by the General Services Administrator, a presidential
appointee and member of the executive branch. Additionally, the Act ex-
pressly allowed the President to assert any privilege as to preserved materi-
als. The Court also found, in the second step of its inquiry, that the statute
promoted important public interests that were consistent with prior
statutes. 107
Following Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, several lower
courts held that the separation of powers doctrine did not preclude a grant
of qualified immunity to the President.' These courts reasoned that the
President, as a federal official, should be covered by the general rule of
102. Id at 712. See supra note 91.
103. 418 U.S. at 712 n.19.
104. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
105. Id. at 441.
106. 418 U.S. at 711-12. See Note, supra note 13, at 900-02.
107. 433 U.S. at 452-54.
108. See Halperin, 606 F.2d at 1211-12 ("The doctrine of separation of powers wisely
counsels the judiciary to act with care when reviewing the acts by other branches, but the
courts may not evade their constitutional responsibility to delineate the obligations and
powers of each branch"); see also Clark v. United States, 481 F. Supp. 1086, 1090-91
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (denial of President Nixon's motion to dismiss), appeal dismissed, 624 F.2d
3 (2d Cir. 1980).
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qualified immunity established by Economou. But the Supreme Court had
not directly considered an absolute immunity claim by a President.
V. THE CASE FOR ABSOLUTE PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY
In January, 1970, A. Ernest Fitzgerald, a management analyst, lost his
job with the Air Force."o The dismissal came fourteen months after Fitz-
gerald testified before a joint congressional subcommittee that cost-over-
runs on the C-5A transport plane would reach $2 billion.11o Although the
Air Force stated that Fitzgerald's dismissal was part of a departmental re-
organization and reduction in force,'1I Fitzgerald alleged that he had been
the victim of unlawful retaliation because of his congressional
testimony.' 1
2
Fitzgerald filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia seeking damages from various White House and Department of
Defense officials." 3 The district court dismissed the suit, ruling that the
statute of limitations had run. The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit affirmed as to all defendants except White
House aide Alexander Butterfield. In July 1978, Fitzgerald amended his
complaint to include President Nixon, "l4 White House aide Bryce Harlow,
109. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2693 (1982).
110. Id at 2694.
111. Id at 2693.
112. Id at 2695.
113. Id at 2696. Prior to filing suit, Fitzgerald had sought relief from the United States
Civil Service Commission. In September 1973, a hearing examiner for the Commission held
that Fitzgerald's dismissal violated civil service regulations because it had been motivated by
reasons "purely personal to" Fitzgerald. Id at 2695-96. The examiner, however, found that
the evidence did not support Fitzgerald's contention that he had been fired in retaliation for
his testimony. The Commission recommended that Fitzgerald be assigned to his former
position or one of comparable authority. Id at 2696.
Prior to the ruling in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, Fitzgerald had been successful in obtaining
significant relief. President Nixon agreed to pay Fitzgerald a settlement of $142,000. An
additional $28,000 would have been paid to Fitzgerald if he had prevailed before the
Supreme Court. Fitzgerald also received backpay and as of June 21, 1982, his former posi-
tion with the Air Force. See 102 S. Ct. at 2696 n. 17, 2698-99.
114. According to the Court, President Nixon's involvement in the Fitzgerald dismissal,
based on the record, was as follows: After being questioned about the Fitzgerald dismissal
at a news conference in December 1969, President Nixon promised to look into the matter.
He apparently made an effort to find another job for Fitzgerald within the Administration.
At a second news conference in January 1973, President Nixon was again asked about Fitz-
gerald. At the news conference, President Nixon assumed personal responsibility for the
firing. A day later, the White House retracted President Nixon's statement, claiming that the
President had not been involved in the Fitzgerald firing but had confused Fitzgerald with
another former civil servant. 102 S. Ct. at 2694-95.
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and other Nixon administration officials."' By March 1980, only Nixon,
Harlow, and Butterfield remained as defendants.
The defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming that they were
absolutely immune from civil suit." 6 The district court issued an order
denying the motion, reasoning that, on the basis of Economou and
Haperin, absolute immunity was not available."I7 The district court found
that Fitzgerald had five valid claims for damages against Nixon, Harlow,
and Butterfield."' Two claims arose under federal statutes designed to
protect civil servants who cooperate in congressional investigations." 9 A
third damages claim, alleging violation of Fitzgerald's first amendment
right to freedom of speech, arose directly under the Constitution.
The defendants then filed collateral appeals from the district court's or-
der in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. 2 ° However, the District of Columbia Circuit dismissed summa-
rily, apparently on the ground that it lacked proper jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the appeal. 2 ' The Supreme Court granted certiorari' 22
and, in a five-to-four decision, held that the President was absolutely im-
mune from civil suit.' 23 Writing for the majority, Justice Powell found
115. Id at 2697.
116. Id,;Iarlow, 102 S. Ct. at 2732.
117. Fitzgerald v. Butterfield, No. 74-178 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 1980) (order denying motion
for summary judgment). The Court ruled that genuine issues of fact remained as to whether
even qualified immunity should be granted the three defendants.
118. Two common law claims certified by the district court were subsequently dropped
by Fitzgerald. 102 S. Ct. at 2697 n.20.
119. 5 U.S.C. § 7211 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) provides: "The right of employees, individ-
ually or collectively, to petition Congress or a Member of Congress, or to furnish informa-
tion to either House of Congress, or to a committee or Member thereof, may not be
interfered with or denied." 18 U.S.C. § 1505 makes it a criminal offense for anyone to ob-
struct a congressional investigation. The statute specifically covers any retaliatory actions
aimed at witnesses who participate in a congressional or executive branch proceeding. A
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (1976) is punishable by imprisonment for a maximum of five
years and a maximum fine of $5,000. The district court ruled that Fitzgerald was entitled to
infer a cause of action for damages under both statutes although neither law expressly con-
ferred one. The validity of the inferred causes of action was not before the Supreme Court.
102 S. Ct. at 2697 n.20.
120. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. at 2697 n.20; Harlow, 102 S. Ct. at 2732.
121. Fitzgerald v. Butterfield, No. 80-1406 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 30, 1980). See Nixon v. Fitz-
gerald, 102 S. Ct. at 2697-98.
122. 452 U.S. 959 (1981).
123. In order to address President Nixon's appeal on the merits, the Supreme Court first
held the district court's collateral order appealable under the doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. at 2698. Cohen sets forth
criteria for determining when an interlocutory order is appealable. One of the criteria re-
quires that the order present an unsettled question of law. The Court surmised that the
District of Columbia Circuit had dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
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that the Constitution supported a grant of absolute immunity to the Presi-
dent. Noting that article II of the Constitution vested the federal govern-
ment's executive power in the President, Justice Powell stressed that the
President was entrusted with wide-ranging responsibilities "of utmost dis-
cretion and sensitivity."' 24 Since the President is unique among govern-
ment officials, prior cases recognizing qualified immunity for governors
and cabinet officers are inapposite on the issue of presidential immunity.
Moreover, a President's independence is protected by the separation of
powers doctrine. The Court observed that the judiciary may assert juris-
diction over the President only when the purpose for extending such juris-
diction outweighs "the dangers of intruding on executive branch
authority."' 25 Judicial action is permitted only when it promotes "broad
public interests." As examples of justifiable intrusions the Court cited
United States v. Nixon, where the judiciary had acted to safeguard fairness
in criminal trials, and Youngstown, where the Court had acted to maintain
the separation of powers balance. The Court concluded that Fitzgerald's
"merely private suit for damages" did not warrant the exercise of jurisdic-
tion over the President.
26
The Court then explored the public policy rationales it has historically
used to justify grants of absolute immunity. According to the Court, a
President's decisions were likely to arouse intense feelings. Because of his
visibility, the President easily could become a target for civil suits. The
Court observed that civil liability would divert presidential energies into
defending suits, to the public's detriment. 27 In addition, personal liability
would undercut the public's interest in ensuring that the President carries
out his duties fearlessly and impartially. Finally, the Court found confir-
mation for absolute presidential immunity in constitutional history.' 21
The Court concluded that it was appropriate to recognize absolute immu-
because it earlier had ruled in Halperin against absolute immunity for a President and his
aides. The Supreme Court disagreed with the dismissal, pointing out that it previously had
held that denials of absolute immunity were appealable under the Cohen criteria. See also
Harlow, 102 S. Ct. at 2732 n. 11.
124. 102 S. Ct. at 2702.
125. Id at 2704.
126. Id
127. Id at 2703.
128. See id at 2702 n.3 1. In a footnote, the Court stated that absolute presidential im-
munity should be inferred from the silence of the constitutional convention on the issue and
that body's decision to specify impeachment as the appropriate remedy for official miscon-
duct. The majority went on to quote Thomas Jefferson, Justice Story, and two delegates to
the constitutional convention. But the Court also noted that historical materials on the
framers' intent are "fragmentary" and, therefore, less compelling than the argument based
on the separation of powers doctrine. Id
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nity for all acts within the "outer perimeter" of the President's official re-
sponsibilities,'29 but reserved the question of whether Congress could
impose liability by statute.' 30
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger disagreed with the major-
ity's contention that Congress may still impose civil liability on the Presi-
dent. The Chief Justice underscored the fact that absolute immunity
flowed from the separation of powers doctrine. 3 ' Because absolute presi-
dential immunity is "mandated" by the Constitution's separation of pow-
ers doctrine, Congress would be barred from legislating liability for the
President. In addition, Chief Justice Burger argued that the need to pre-
vent a "large scale invasion" of the executive branch by the judiciary far
outweighed any need to vindicate private claims.' 32
Writing for the dissent, 33 Justice White acknowledged the President's
unique constitutional status, but argued that the need for a unique rule of
immunity had not been demonstrated. In addition, the exemption con-
flicted with the principle underlying Bivens that injured parties are entitled
to obtain damages in federal court for violations of their constitutional
rights. According to the dissent, the remedial principle the Court has ad-
hered to--that a wrongdoer normally should bear the costs of injury-
should apply to the President unless governmental decisionmaking is un-
dermined. Moreover, a blanket exemption would violate the longstanding
principle of equal justice under law, reverting to the proposition that "the
King can do no wrong."'"
The dissent also disagreed with the majority's separation of powers anal-
ysis.' 35 Using the balancing test articulated in Nixon v. Administrator of
General Services, the dissent would have focused the inquiry on whether
jurisdiction would interfere impermissibly with one of the President's
129. The Court contended that immunity from civil suit would not place the President
above the law because other remedies would be available to check a President's abuse of
power. Id at 2706. The majority stated that impeachment, scrutiny by the press and Con-
gress, and the President's concern for his own stature were sufficient safeguards.
130. Id at 2701 n.27.
131. Id at 2707 (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("Absolute immunity for a President for acts
within the official duties of the Chief Executive is either to be found in the constitutional
separation of powers or it does not exist.").
132. According to Chief Justice Burger's research, only on two occasions has a private
party sued a President for acts committed in office. Id at 2706 n.i.
133. In a separate dissent, Justice Blackmun criticized the Court for stating on the one
hand that Congress may subject a President to liability by statute and, on the other, that
absolute immunity is compelled by the separation of powers doctrine. According to Justice
Blackmun: "mhese two concepts. . . cannot coexist." Id at 2727.
134. Id at 2711 (White, J., dissenting). See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
135. Id at 2710.
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"constitutionally assigned functions."' 36 The dissent concluded that the
assertion of jurisdiction in this case did not interfere with a presidential
function. 3
7
Justice White also disputed the majority's view that civil liability against
the President was barred by the separation of powers doctrine because it
failed to serve "broad public interests."' 31 Instead, the dissent contended
that such liability promotes the separation of powers doctrine because it
furthers two important interests, the individual's right to legal redress and
the enforcement of the rule of law. In addition, Justice White stated that
the Court's view that liability is precluded by separation of powers princi-
ples "assumes that presidential functions are to be valued over congres-
sional functions."' 39 Finally, the dissent found no support for absolute
presidential liability in constitutional history.' 4
Nor is the Court's holding justified on practical grounds, according to
the dissent. In response to the contention that the President's visibility
makes absolute immunity necessary, Justice White pointed out that suits
against the President are quite rare. Even after Bivens in 1971, only a few
suits have been filed against the President and they have been dealt with
routinely by the Justice Department. In addition, the dissent observed that
Harlow provided even more reason to believe that "frivolous claims will
not intrude upon the President's time."''
VI. NIXON v FITZGE ILD: A CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH
TO IMMUNITY
In Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court recognizes absolute presiden-
tial immunity as a constitutional imperative. In doing so, the Court de-
parts from its traditional approaches to two areas of the law-official
immunity and separation of powers.
Since its decisions in Imb/er and Economou, the Court had adhered to a
136. Id at 2717.
137. Id at 2725.
138. Id at 2704.
139. Id at 2721 (White, J., dissenting).
140. In support of the dissent's position, Justice White argued that it was improper to
infer absolute immunity from the constitutional convention's silence. See supra note 128.
The dissent also argued that the convention did not focus on "wrongs the President might
commit against individuals, but rather on whether there should be a method of holding him
accountable for what might be termed wrongs against the state." 102 S. Ct. at 2713-14
(White, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). Justice White also cited several statements from
state ratifying conventions suggesting that presidential liability to civil suit was assumed. Id
at 2715.
141. Id at 2725.
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functional analysis to determine the scope of official immunity. The func-
tional approach dictated that absolute protection be granted only for sensi-
tive governmental functions where an official can demonstrate that public
policy requires it. In this way, the Court had sought to accommodate two
competing interests: the injured party's right to compensation for constitu-
tional violations and the public's right to effective government.
The Fitzgerald majority adopts a variation on this theme that is superfi-
cially appealing, but ultimately unconvincing. The majority observes that
the President performs so many sensitive functions that determining which
function gave rise to a particular activity would be "difficult" and would
lead to an intrusive inquiry into presidential motives.142 Like the prosecu-
tor and the judge, a President is likely to arouse intense feelings. More-
over, the majority argues that the President's visibility would make him an
easily indentifiable target for lawsuits. Liability to suit could distract a
President from his duties and inhibit fearless performance of official du-
ties, to the public's detriment.
Application of the functional approach to the facts of Fitzgerald, how-
ever, as the dissent notes, quickly dispels the notion that the functional
analysis is too difficult to apply here. In Fitzgerald, the former President
performed a personnel function pursuant to his legal authority to supervise
the manner in which the Secretary of Defense conducts Air Force busi-
ness.'43 That function carries some of the indicia the Court used in Econo-
mou and Imbler to justify a blanket exemption from liability."' Like a
judge, for example, a President exercising his personnel authority could
well engender hostility from disgruntled former employees and thereby
subject himself to civil suit. Also, certain safeguards exist to rectify arbi-
trary actions that would tend to support a grant of absolute immunity for
personnel functions.' 45
That the balance may favor absolute immunity from suit in the person-
nel area,'4 however, does not justify a blanket exemption from all civil
142. Id at 2705.
143. Id
144. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
145. The review provided Fitzgerald by the Civil Service Commission arguably afforded
him a form of appellate relief and served as a check on official abuse of personnel power.
146. A persuasive case can be made that absolute immunity is not required for the Presi-
dent's personnel activities. As the dissent points out, personnel powers are bounded by vari-
ous statutes and civil service regulations, suggesting that the public interest requires more
caution and less vigor on the part of officials, including the President. 102 S. Ct. at 2721-22
(White, J., dissenting). Impeachment and other broad societal remedies simply are not cred-
ible deterrents to unlawful official conduct. In addition, complete immunity for the Presi-
dent is unlikely to produce more uninhibited decisionmaking since subordinates make most
personnel decisions without the President's participation. Id at 2726.
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liability. The burden is on the President to demonstrate why such broad
immunity is "essential for the conduct of the public business."' 14 7 Instead,
a majority of the Court has shifted the focus from an inquiry based on
function to one based on the office of the presidency itself. In doing so, the
Court has abdicated its historic responsibility for deciding whether public
ends would be served by a grant of immunity.'48 Moreover, it has violated
the longstanding principle of equal justice under law. That principle re-
quires that the law treat each individual equally, without regard to the
office held.' 9 An exemption for Presidential misconduct will undermine
the public's faith in our political system's fairness. 5 °
The Fitzgerald Court also makes a disturbing detour from the separation
of powers analysis established by prior case law. That analysis requires a
court to balance the constitutional weight of the interest asserted against
the dangers to governance posed by the intrusion. 5' In Fitzgerald, the
Court has abandoned its traditional approach in favor of an analysis
weighted heavily in favor of presidential privilege. The majority con-
cludes that jurisdiction may only be asserted over the Presidency if that
assertion serves "broad public interests." Based on the examples provided
by the Court, it appears that a suit may proceed only if the interest to be
served involves the criminal justice system as in United States v. Nixon or
implicates Congress's legislative prerogatives as in Youngstown. Such a
difficult standard is unwarranted and is inconsistent with the balancing test
the Court has used previously. In those cases, the Court has recognized
that resolution of separation of powers questions requires full considera-
tion of the interests of each of the branches involved.' 5 2
147. Economou, 438 U.S. at 507.
148. Maleo, 360 U.S. at 572-73. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. See also
Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 242.
149. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163 ("The government of the United
States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly
cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a
vested legal right."). See supra note 86.
150. See Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. at 2711 n.2 (White, J., dissenting) ("It is ironic that this
decision should come out at the time of the tenth anniversary of the Watergate affair.").
151. 102 S. Ct. at 2704. See also Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. at
443; United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 703-13.
152. It is unclear whether the statute involved in Nixon v. Administrator of General Sen'-
ices could pass muster on the basis of the separation of powers standard articulated in Fitz-
gerald. As in Fitzgerald, Administrator of General Services involved federal law, thereby
implicating a congressional interest. Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S.
at 443. See also Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. at 2717 (White, J., dissenting) (The judici-
ary's interest in Fitzgerald in vindicating constitutional rights was also implicated). In both
cases, President Nixon asserted an absolute immunity from judicial process. The counter-
vailing interest in Administrator of General Services was the public's right to preserve White
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In Fitzgerald, the roles of both the judiciary and the Congress are impli-
cated in the separation of powers question. The judiciary has an interest in
vindicating the rights of private parties. In addition, the presence of Fitz-
gerald's statutory causes of action indicate that Congress has an interest in
assuring a continuing flow of information to it. By ignoring the congres-
sional interest, the Court appears to assume that "presidential functions
are to be valued over congressional functions."'1 3 The heavy emphasis on
presidential prerogatives reflects a view of separation of powers that the
Court, following the lead of the framers,'54 has consistently rejected.' 55
Equally troubling is the Court's apparent failure to fulfill the Court's his-
toric responsibility "to say what the law is."' 5 6 In the past, the Court has
declined presidential invitations to extend an absolute privilege in a cer-
tain area in favor of a more flexible, case-by-case approach.' 7
The advantages of the Court's conventional approach are apparent
when that approach is applied to the facts of Fitzgerald. Applying the bal-
ancing test and assuming, as the majority asserts, personnel matters are a
"constitutionally assigned" presidential function, allowing Fitzgerald's
case to go forward arguably could be disruptive of that function. If so, it is
not clear that Fitzgerald could justify the "intrusion" on the basis of an
"overriding need" to promote the judicial objective of compensating in-
House tapes and papers for archival purposes. That interest is important. But, if the statute
in Administrator of General Services does not violate the separation of powers doctrine, and
there is no suggestion that the Court has overruled its decision, it is difficult to see how the
public's interest in redressing violations of constitutional rights in Fitzgerald is any less
"broad."
153. 102 S. Ct. at 2721 (White, J., dissenting).
154. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 302-03 (J. Madison) (New American Library ed.
1961). Additionally, constitutional history is inconclusive on the question of presidential
immunity. The constitutional convention's silence provides little support for the proposition
that the framers intended the President to be immune. Accord Halperin, 606 F.2d at 1211
(quoting Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc)). The Fitzgerald
majority tacitly admits as much in its presentation of historical support. First, the Court has
devoted only a footnote to its evidence. Second, the weight of that evidence is undercut by
the Court's admission that it is "fragmentary." See supra note 128.
155. Compare Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. at 2707 (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("The essential
purpose of the separation of powers is to allow for independent functioning of each co-equal
branch of government .. ") with United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707 ("[T]he Framers
of the Constitution sought to provide a comprehensive system, but the separate powers were
not intended to operate with absolute independence.") and Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635
(Jackson, J., concurring) ("While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty,
it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable
government.").
156. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. See supra note 91.
157. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 593-660 (Jackson, J., concurring); United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. at 711-12.
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jured parties. 5 ' Whether using conventional separation of powers analy-
sis would have barred Fitzgerald's suit is beside the point. The point is
that the Court could have limited its holding to the facts of Fitzgerald's
case or even to the personnel function without precluding pending and
future claims against a President that may be more meritorious.' 59
The Nixon v. Fitzgerald decision, when viewed in light of prior case law,
is a result-oriented opinion. The Court's hastiness to generate a rigid rule
for the future appears to reflect its determination that President Nixon
should not be liable in damages. Because Fitzgerald could have defeated
former President Nixon's qualified immunity claim, the Court found it
necessary to grant absolute immunity."6 The solution ordered by the
Court, however, reaches far beyond the facts of "this merely private suit
for damages." First, the Court's decision precludes all pending and future
damage claims against an incumbent or former President for acts commit-
ted while in office, regardless of the circumstances. Second, by couching
its holding in constitutional terms, the Court probably has preempted Con-
gress from imposing civil liability on the President in the future.' 6 '
158. Prior to the decision in Fitzgerald, President Nixon agreed to pay Fitzgerald a settle-
ment of $142,000. Additionally, Fitzgerald had received back pay. As of June 21, 1982,
moreover, the Air Force had agreed to reassign Fitzgerald to his former position. In short,
Fitzgerald already appeared to have been compensated.
159. The foreclosure of more substantial claims is not simply hypothetical. See Fitzger-
aid, 102 S. Ct. at 2710 n.l. For example, the Court's absolute immunity rule appears to
preclude monetary relief for Morton Halperin, the former National Security Council Advi-
sor. Halperin alleged that former President Nixon ordered federal agents to wiretap his
house without following appropriate statutory procedures. Id at 2710.
160. Fitzgerald arguably could have made out a case sufficient to block qualified immu-
nity for former President Nixon. Provided that Fitzgerald could show presidential involve-
ment in his dismissal, see supra note 114, he need only demonstrate that President Nixon
knew or should have reasonably known his actions were illegal. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 56-59. If the law were clear at the time, President Nixon would have to rebut a
presumption that he knew the law when he acted. Here, civil service regulations barred the
use of a "reduction in force" to fire Fitzgerald. 102 S. Ct. at 2696 n. 16. Therefore, President
Nixon would have been presumed to know that his particular course of action was
prohibited.
161. Although the Court appears to sanction congressional action imposing liability, a
majority of the Court concludes that such action is barred by the Court's holding that abso-
lute protection is mandated by the separation of powers doctrine. See 102 S. Ct. at 2712-13
(White, J., dissenting); id at 2709 n.7 (Burger, C.J., concurring). It is difficult to see how
passage of a new law authorizing damages relief against the President would stand on any
firmer ground vis-a-vis the separation of powers doctrine than existing law. One of the
statutes under which Fitzgerald brought his action, 5 U.S.C. § 7211 (1976 & Supp. V 1981),
was specifically enacted as part of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454,
92 Stat. 1111, 1217 (1978), to protect whistleblowers such as Fitzgerald from reprisals. See S.
REP. No. 969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws 2723,
2730-31.
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The abandonment of the functional approach simply is not warranted
by public policy. As the majority itself observes, the historical record
shows that lawsuits against the President have been few.' 62 The Court's
modification of the qualified immunity standard in Harlow v. Fitzgerald
should facilitate the dismissal of frivolous suits. These suits are a legiti-
mate concern because, while they ultimately may be unsuccessful, they
drain the resources and energies of government officials and inhibit the
vigorous performance of official duties. In Economou, the Court stressed
the need for prompt dismissal of frivolous suits.163 Lower federal courts
have tried to follow the Supreme Court's lead and have been sensitive to
the problem posed by frivolous claims against officials generally."6 The
Court's goal, however, has been thwarted, at least in part, by the subjective
component of the qualified immunity standard, which has often raised a
genuine issue of material fact as to a defendant's state of mind and thus
has prevented summary judgment. 165
Under the standard established by Harlow, however, litigants will have
a difficult time piercing the qualified immunity veil to sue the President."
162. 102 S. Ct. at 2703 n.33. Chief Justice Burger found only one instance, prior to
Bivens, in which a citizen sued a former President for acts committed during his tenure in
office. Id at 2706 n.1 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
163. "Insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by federal courts alert to the pos-
sibilities of artful pleading. Unless the complaint states a compensable claim for relief under
the Federal Constitution, it should not survive a motion to dismiss." Economou, 438 U.S. at
507-08. See also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. at 2733; Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d at
1209 & n.116.
164. In Halperin, the District of Columbia Circuit echoed the Supreme Court's admoni-
tion in Economou that wherever possible, courts should resolve the immunity issue in favor
of the official on summary judgment. 606 F.2d 1209-10. The Court stated that the "central
problem" of the immunity doctrine is "[h]ow to make effective the use of summary proce-
dures in preventing harassment of Executive officials." Id at 1210 n.121. The court stated
that close control of discovery was essential to making official immunity meaningful. Id at
1209 n.120. It suggested that district courts, where disclosure by public officials is required,
mandate that, where feasible, subordinate officials be deposed before high-level officials. Id
See also Sweeney v. Bond, 669 F.2d 542, 546 (8th Cir. 1982) (deposition of governor barred
by qualified immunity if specific need is absent); Harper v. Miller, 491 F. Supp. 217, 218
(D.D.C. 1980) (discussion of immunity question allowed by court in oral argument on unre-
lated issue to expedite prompt resolution of immunity issue).
165. The problem was discussed by the District of Columbia Circuit in Halperin:
This course [dismissal on summary judgment] is best suited for handling the objec-
tive basis for qualified immunity. Courts should be able to determine at the pre-
trial stage whether there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the reasonableness
of a defendant's belief that he was acting legally. On the subjective criterion-
which 'turns on officials' knowledge and good faith belief'-summary action may
be more difficult. Questions of intent and subjective attitude frequently cannot be
resolved without direct testimony of those involved.
606 F.2d at 1209 (citations omitted).
166. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982).
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Like absolute immunity, qualified immunity would clothe the President
with protection across the broad spectrum of his discretionary responsibili-
ties. 16 7 A plaintiff would have to overcome a plethora of practical difficul-
ties in order to prosecute a suit against a President. For example, it is likely
that an action against a President would be stayed until the President
leaves office. ' 68
In addition, although a President would be expected to know the rele-
vant law under the qualified immunity standard, he would be entitled "to
consult fewer sources and expend less effort inquiring into the circum-
stances of a localized problem."'' 69 Were a litigant able to puncture the
President's immunity, he still might fail in his bid to obtain damages be-
cause of the wide range of executive branch acts carried out by subordi-
nates. If not personally involved, a President would not be vicariously
liable for the acts of his subordinates. 17 Taken together, these factors ex-
plain why the District of Columbia Circuit in Halper;n, prior even to the
modification of the qualified immunity standard in Harlow, predicted that
successful suits against the President would be "quite rare."'17'
The President's unique constitutional status distinguishes him from any
other executive branch official. Because the Presidency is sui generis, it is
unlikely that any other official can make out a valid claim to absolute im-
munity under the rule of Nixon v. Fitzgerald. The decision, however,
could have significant impact in other respects.
Nixon v. Fitzgerald suggests that the Court will tilt in favor of the presi-
dency and the executive branch when the separation of powers doctrine is
implicated in the future. In United States v. Nixon, the Court failed to
reach the question of whether judicial process over the President for the
purpose of civil suits could be justified. Nixon v. Fitzgerald provides an
emphatic answer to this question. Another question the Court reserved
was the separation of powers implications of congressional demands for
information.' 72 On the strength of Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the majority of the
Court will approach the question with a heavy bias towards presidential
prerogatives.
167. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 247.
168. See Haperin, 606 F.2d at 1213 ("District Courts should be sensitive to the ex-
traordinary practical difficulties confronting a President who is charged in such a suit."). See
also Brief for Respondent at 28, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982) ("With respect
to the incumbent, the district court can stay all proceedings until he leaves office.").
169. Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83, 93 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
170. Leonhard v. United States, 633 F.2d 599, 621 n.30 (2d Cir. 1980); Lander v. Morton,
518 F.2d 1084, 1087 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
171. 606 F.2d at 1212.
172. 418 U.S. at 712 n.19.
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Taken together, the Fitzgerald cases demonstrate that a significant shift
has occurred in the Court's view of official liability. In the 1970's, the
Court dramatically expanded official liability by recognizing in Bivens a
right of redress against government officials derived solely from the Con-
stitution. In Economou, the Court took steps to safeguard this right by
qualifying the immunity available to officials sued for damages. Nixon v.
Fitzgerald and Harlow v. Fitzgerald show that the period of expansion of
official liability has ended. With these decisions, the Court has contracted
liability in response to the growth in civil suits against public officials. 173
This contraction of liability is likely to continue. 174
VII. CONCLUSION
In Nirn v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court has departed abruptly from
nearly two hundred years of precedent on the official immunity issue and
the separation of powers doctrine. These departures weaken longstanding
values embodied in that case law, values that have served this country
well. Prior immunity cases reflect the Court's historic commitment to
equal justice under law and to vindicating individual rights of redress
without undermining the public's interest in effective government. Prior
separation of powers cases have allowed the Court to accommodate the
competing interests of the federal government's branches and to preserve
the balance envisioned by the framers. The Court's violation of these im-
portant principles simply is not compelled by the Constitution or public
policy. The new qualified immunity standard alone would protect the
government from institutional harm without undercutting the ability of the
courts to satisfy meritorious claims for damages.
Theodore P. Stein
173. See Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d at 1214 (Gesell, J., concurring) ("We should not
close our eyes to the fact that with increasing frequency in this jurisdiction and throughout
the country plaintiffs are filing suits seeking damage awards against high government offi-
cials. . . . The effect of this development upon the willingness of individuals to serve their
country is obvious.").
174. For example, the Court has indicated that officials who perform foreign policy or
national security functions deserve absolute immunity from civil suit. Harlow, 102 S. Ct. at
2735. See alro Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. at 2703; The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L.
Rav. 62, 236 (1982).
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